Bangladesh’s Shift: How a Three-Front India Impacts Taiwan & US Strategy

The question of whether China will attack Taiwan is often framed by cross-Strait dynamics and Beijing’s military capabilities. However, a critical, and often overlooked, variable is India’s strategic position and the number of simultaneous security challenges New Delhi faces. Recent developments, particularly a shifting alignment in Bangladesh, are raising concerns that India is facing a potential three-front dilemma – a scenario that could significantly constrain its ability to influence China’s calculations regarding Taiwan.

A Shifting Landscape in Dhaka

For decades, Bangladesh maintained a largely stable relationship with India, cooperating on counterterrorism, connectivity, and managing China’s growing influence in the region. This alignment, largely fostered during the long tenure of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, provided a degree of predictability for New Delhi. However, the political landscape in Bangladesh has undergone a significant transformation. Following Hasina’s ousting in 2024, and subsequent flight to India after a failed crackdown on student-led protests, a new leadership emerged, recalibrating foreign policy priorities and intensifying domestic resentment toward India. This shift has manifested in a revival of defense ties with Pakistan – a country with whom Bangladesh shares a fraught history stemming from the 1971 Liberation War – and a deepening engagement with China.

In May 2025, Bangladesh formally cancelled a $21 million contract with India’s Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers for a naval tug, marking the first instance of a formal defense deal being scrapped. This cancellation, coupled with the suspension of joint army exercises (SAMPRITI, which had been a decade-long pattern), signals a clear cooling in security cooperation. Simultaneously, China has been actively courting Dhaka, announcing in April 2024 that People’s Liberation Army personnel would participate in a counterterrorism training event in Bangladesh – a first for the two countries. While reporting on the actual execution of that training is limited, the announcement itself underscored Dhaka’s growing openness to security partnerships beyond India.

Pakistan and China Move In

As India’s influence wanes, Pakistan and China have moved to fill the void. In late 2024, Bangladesh placed its largest-ever order for artillery ammunition with Pakistan Ordnance Factory, exceeding its 2023 purchase by more than threefold. This was followed by high-level military exchanges, including a visit by Bangladesh’s Quartermaster General to Pakistan in August 2025, and a reciprocal visit by Pakistan’s Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Dhaka in October 2025. These interactions signaled a clear intent to institutionalize military and industrial ties. Bangladesh is reportedly considering the acquisition of up to 48 JF-17 fighter jets from Pakistan, alongside 20 J-10CEs from China, in a deal valued at $2.2 billion, as part of its broader military modernization plan, Forces Goal 2030.

This growing alignment with China and Pakistan is particularly concerning for India due to the potential for a coordinated approach to regional security. The J-10CE, already operated by the Pakistani Air Force, is being marketed as combat-credible following its reported performance in a recent clash with India. If Bangladesh adopts the same system, it could lead to shared tactics, maintenance procedures, and potentially even limited intelligence cooperation, complicating India’s air defense planning. China’s increasing naval presence in the Bay of Bengal, including financing a submarine facility near Cox’s Bazar and frequent port calls by Chinese navy vessels, further exacerbates these concerns.

Implications for India’s Strategic Posture

The potential for a three-front dilemma – facing challenges from China to the north, Pakistan to the west, and a more aligned Bangladesh to the east – significantly reduces India’s freedom of action and narrows one of the most plausible sources of strategic uncertainty for Beijing when considering a potential move against Taiwan. A less-encircled India could play a more consequential role in a Taiwan crisis, potentially threatening China’s sea lines of communication and offering its ports and airfields as enablers for U.S. And allied forces. However, a three-front scenario would likely force India to prioritize its own immediate security concerns, limiting its ability to project power beyond its borders.

This shift in the regional balance likewise has broader implications for the Indo-Pacific. The United States has historically treated Bangladesh as important but secondary, framing its policy through an India-centric lens. However, the changing dynamics in Dhaka necessitate a reassessment of U.S. Strategy. As the 2025 National Security Strategy underscores, low- and middle-income states are key battlegrounds in the competition with China.

Rethinking U.S. Strategy Towards Bangladesh

A more proactive U.S. Approach to Bangladesh could involve offering credible security alternatives to Chinese and Pakistani arms, such as exploring the transfer of excess defense articles like F-16 fighter jets. While this would require addressing concerns about information security and establishing a robust security-of-information framework, it could provide Bangladesh with a viable alternative to relying on China and Pakistan for its defense needs. The United States could pursue an economic track aimed at easing Bangladesh’s trade transition as it graduates from least-developed country status, providing preferential tariffs and market access in exchange for continued security cooperation.

The Excess Defense Article Program

The U.S. Excess Defense Article program offers a promising avenue for strengthening security ties with Bangladesh. Dhaka has successfully integrated C-130 transport aircraft, Hamilton-class cutters, and mine-resistant vehicles acquired through this program, demonstrating its ability to manage and operate U.S. Equipment. Expanding this program, or exploring options for transferring excess F-16s, could provide Bangladesh with a credible alternative to Chinese fighters and further integrate it into the U.S. Security architecture.

What’s Confirmed vs. Unclear

It is confirmed that Bangladesh has significantly shifted its foreign policy posture, moving closer to China and Pakistan and distancing itself from India. The cancellation of the defense contract with India, the suspension of joint military exercises, and the increased military cooperation with Pakistan and China are all verifiable facts. However, the extent to which this shift will translate into a formal security alliance or a coordinated military strategy remains unclear. Similarly, the details of the proposed arms deals with China and Pakistan, including the specific terms and conditions, are still emerging. The long-term impact of these developments on regional stability and the potential implications for a Taiwan contingency are also subject to ongoing assessment.

Looking ahead, the United States and India will need to closely monitor the situation in Bangladesh and work together to mitigate the risks posed by its shifting alignment. A more proactive and nuanced U.S. Strategy, coupled with a continued strengthening of India-U.S. Strategic cooperation, will be essential to maintaining a stable and balanced Indo-Pacific region. The key will be to offer Bangladesh viable alternatives that allow it to pursue its own security interests without becoming overly reliant on China and Pakistan, thereby preserving India’s strategic bandwidth and bolstering deterrence in the face of potential Chinese aggression.