China’s Expanding Education Footprint in the Western Balkans: A New Strategy

Beijing’s expanding educational footprint in the Western Balkans represents a nuanced shift in its European strategy, moving away from the more visible – and increasingly scrutinized – Confucius Institutes towards a decentralized network of partnerships and programs. While concerns mount in Washington and Brussels over potential influence operations and technology transfer, China is finding a receptive environment in a region characterized by political fragmentation and economic demand. This isn’t a retreat from Europe, but an adaptation, reshaping its institutional presence and diversifying channels for projecting influence, particularly in countries pursuing multi-vector foreign policies.

Serbia: A Regional Hub for Chinese Engagement

Serbia has emerged as a key strategic partner for China in the Balkans, retaining its 34th place in the 2024 China Index – the highest ranking in the region – according to the China Index report. This position is bolstered by a close relationship with President Aleksandar Vučić and considerable goodwill among the Serbian population. Beijing’s approach in Serbia extends beyond traditional language and cultural programs, encompassing industrial investment linked to academic training. With three Confucius Institutes already established, Mandarin is now an elective subject in over 60 public schools, and even a compulsory subject in some, signaling a normalization of Chinese linguistic and cultural presence.

The cooperation isn’t limited to language instruction. Surveillance technology firm Dahua Technologies and tire manufacturer Linglong have both signed cooperation agreements with the University of Kragujevac, establishing scholarship programs for Serbian students. This linkage of industrial investment with academic training reinforces China’s influence across multiple sectors. Rather than relying solely on Confucius Institutes – which have faced increasing scrutiny and closures in Western Europe due to concerns over censorship and influence – China is broadening its engagement to include municipalities and private enterprises, diffusing its institutional footprint. A Chinese cultural center, built on the site of the former Chinese embassy bombed during the 1999 NATO intervention, opened in Belgrade in 2021, leveraging memory politics to further enhance China’s legitimacy and popularity.

Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Testing Ground for Educational Diplomacy

While Serbia offers a favorable political climate, Bosnia and Herzegovina presents a different opportunity for China: a fragmented political landscape and weak economic prospects create a more pliable environment for testing its educational diplomacy. China exploits the divided political structure – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska – to maintain relationships with elites in both entities. Notably, the Sinology Department at the University of Eastern Sarajevo consistently achieves enrollment quotas, a rare success story within the country’s higher education system. Between 2011 and 2022, 97 students completed their undergraduate studies in the Chinese language, a significant number for a region with an estimated population of 1.1 million.

Educational ties are further reinforced through various scholarship programs, including degree-oriented programs and the China/UNESCO Great Wall Fellowship. The University of East Sarajevo has also signed an agreement with the University for International Studies in Jilin to provide dual degrees, deepening institutional dependency on Chinese partner institutions. This approach allows China to circumvent some of the scrutiny faced by Confucius Institutes elsewhere, operating within a less regulated environment.

Montenegro: Sector-Specific Cooperation and Emerging Concerns

Montenegro, with a population of around 630,000, presents another facet of China’s strategy: sector-specific and technology-linked cooperation. While hosting only one Confucius Institute, it saw approximately 5,000 enrollments in its courses in 2019 alone. China has also sent over 100 students and more than 100 civil servants to China for exchange programs, extending its influence into Montenegrin public administration. Some analysts even suggest Montenegro, rather than Serbia, is the regional leader in educational cooperation with China.

However, this cooperation has also raised concerns. In June 2025, the University of Montenegro signed a memorandum of cooperation with China’s National Supercomputer Center in Jinan, overseen by the People’s Liberation Army and sanctioned by the U.S. Commerce Department. The agreement covers cryptography, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity. This prompted a public warning from Washington about potential risks of data leakage and knowledge transfer. The fact that the Rector of the University of Montenegro, Vladimir Božović, received his doctorate in the United States in mathematics and cryptography only amplified these concerns. This incident highlights the potential security implications of China’s expanding educational partnerships in the region.

A More Cautious Approach in Albania and North Macedonia, and the Kosovo Exception

In contrast to Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro, China’s educational presence in Albania and North Macedonia remains more limited. Albania hosts one Confucius Institute and several Confucius classrooms, but has actively pushed back against stronger Chinese presence due to its aspirations to join the EU and NATO. China’s engagement in Albania largely focuses on cooperation with Albanian media, cultural diplomacy, and tourism. In North Macedonia, Mandarin has not been widely integrated into the public school system, and China’s educational visibility remains constrained.

A notable exception is Kosovo, which China does not recognize as an independent state. We find no Confucius Institutes or official Chinese language programs. However, Mandarin is offered as an elective subject in over 60 public schools, and scholarships for further language study are available. This demonstrates that China’s educational outreach is not independent of its geopolitical considerations, reinforcing existing political boundaries.

Decentralization and Adaptation: Learning from Past Challenges

Across the Western Balkans, China’s education diplomacy relies on a heterogeneous toolkit: government scholarships, Confucius Institute grants, university-level agreements, short-term training courses, corporate-sponsored programs, and sector-specific research agreements. This shift reflects lessons learned from policy failures in the West, where dozens of Confucius Institutes have closed due to allegations of censorship, surveillance, and undue influence. Unlike institutions like the Goethe-Institut or the British Council, Confucius Institutes are often located within host universities, granting them significant leverage.

The European Union is also facing China’s soft power offensive, with Central and Eastern EU member states particularly vulnerable due to financial constraints at their universities. However, the scale of cooperation with China is significantly larger in the Western Balkans. Despite the fact that most countries in the region view Chinese funding as complementary to EU funding, over half of China’s total investments in Europe have been directed towards the Western Balkans, according to some estimates. This suggests that China views the region as a backdoor to Europe, an environment where partnerships can be sustained with fewer political costs and less scrutiny.

Looking Ahead: A Template for Other Regions?

As the EU struggles with enlargement fatigue and postpones accession for Western Balkan countries, governments in the region are pursuing multi-vector foreign policies. Educational cooperation is often framed as an opportunity rather than a security risk. The EU lacks a clear “China conditionality” in its enlargement policy for the region, creating a vacuum that China is eager to fill.

While some analysts argue that China’s economic diplomacy in the Western Balkans is less ambitious and influential than feared, the region serves as a testing ground for a less centralized and more networked education diplomacy, integrated with technology and statecraft. The classrooms of the Balkans may foreshadow China’s evolving strategy, projecting influence not only through infrastructure and loans but also incrementally through exchanges, scholarships, and curricula. The key challenge for policymakers in Brussels and Washington lies in offering viable alternatives – funding, partnerships, and safeguards – to prevent China’s educational offerings from translating into long-term dependence.