Haiti Crisis: Gangs, Elections & International Intervention – A Deep Dive

Renewed Optimism, Enduring Challenges for Haiti’s Security and Political Future

The United States has expressed cautious optimism regarding the evolving security landscape in Haiti, following commitments from Canada and Japan to contribute to the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, now transitioning into the Gang Suppression Force (GSF). Secretary of State Marco Rubio, speaking at the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) summit this week, indicated that a stabilized environment could pave the way for a return to constitutional rule in the deeply troubled nation. However, this potential for progress is shadowed by profound doubts about the feasibility of credible elections given the scale of political and institutional collapse within Haiti. The situation underscores a long history of state weakness exploited by armed groups, and a cycle of international intervention that has, at times, inadvertently undermined Haitian institutions.

A History of Paramilitary Forces and State Weakness

The current crisis isn’t an isolated event, but rather the latest iteration of a pattern stretching back decades. As political scientist Roromme Chantal, of the Université de Moncton, explains, Haiti’s vulnerability stems from a recurring reliance on irregular armed groups by those in power. This reliance, born of a weak state, has repeatedly allowed these groups to gain autonomy and entrench themselves. During the Duvalier dictatorship, the Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale (VSN) functioned as a state-sponsored paramilitary force. Later, in the 2000s, former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide mobilized armed loyalists known as “chimères.” These groups, initially intended as political tools, gradually evolved into independent actors with their own territorial and financial interests.

The Impact of MINUSTAH’s Withdrawal and PetroCaribe Corruption

The withdrawal of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in 2017, following Aristide’s ouster, is widely seen as a critical turning point. Chantal argues that MINUSTAH, rather than strengthening Haitian national institutions, often substituted for them. “MINUSTAH replaced the Haitian National Police instead of building its capacity,” he said. “When it withdrew, the police were not in a position to take over.” This left a security vacuum that was quickly filled by increasingly powerful gangs.

Compounding this instability was the diversion of billions of dollars from the PetroCaribe oil program, triggering mass protests beginning in 2018. Armed groups exploited the resulting political turmoil, expanding their influence and control over large parts of Port-au-Prince and key transportation routes. By July 2025, estimates suggest that nearly 90 percent of the capital was under gang control.

The Kenyan-Led Mission and Capacity Concerns

Whereas the international community is rallying behind the GSF, concerns remain about its effectiveness. Alex Dupuy, retired sociology professor emeritus at Wesleyan University, points to the limitations of the Haitian police force, stating they “don’t have the firepower or the equipment to do what an army could do.” He too expressed skepticism about the Kenyan-led mission, noting that it “hasn’t done much so far to pacify the country” and that its forces “know nothing about Haiti and don’t speak the language,” hindering their ability to operate effectively outside the capital. The mission’s initial deployment in June 2024 has yet to yield a significant shift in the security situation.

Electoral Obstacles: A Lack of Credible Infrastructure

Beyond the security challenges, the prospect of free and fair elections in Haiti faces formidable logistical and institutional hurdles. More than a million people have been displaced by gang violence, creating a significant obstacle to participation. As Dupuy highlights, displaced citizens need to be able to return home to vote, making universal participation currently impossible.

Even if security improves, fundamental problems remain. Eduardo Gamarra, a professor at Florida International University, emphasizes the lack of a credible electoral registry, a functioning political party system, and the overall capacity to organize a legitimate vote. “A reliable voter roll is the foundation of any democratic process.” The absence of these foundational elements casts serious doubt on the possibility of holding elections that would be widely recognized as legitimate.

Impunity and the Financing of Armed Groups

A critical, often overlooked, aspect of the crisis is the issue of impunity. Chantal argues that prominent Haitian political and business figures accused of financing armed groups have been sanctioned by the United States, Canada, and the United Nations, yet none have been prosecuted. “If those who finance and arm these groups are never held accountable, it becomes highly demanding to dismantle the system.” This lack of accountability perpetuates the cycle of violence and undermines efforts to establish the rule of law.

Regional Agreement and the Path Forward

A regional agreement reached on Monday recognizes Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé as the head of the executive branch and outlines plans to restore security, organize elections, and assist victims of gang violence. However, the agreement notably lacks a clear deadline for Fils-Aimé’s departure from office, raising questions about the timeline for establishing a fully elected government. This ambiguity adds to the uncertainty surrounding Haiti’s political future.

‘Haiti Fatigue’ and the Potential for Alternative Outcomes

The international community’s renewed engagement with Haiti is occurring against a backdrop of growing “Haiti fatigue,” as described by Gamarra, reflecting a waning appetite among donors and governments to commit substantial resources without a clear political roadmap. At the same time, armed groups have become increasingly wealthy and autonomous, even recruiting children from impoverished communities. Some gangs are even distributing food and cash in areas they control, bolstering local loyalty and projecting power through social media.

Gamarra suggests two possible trajectories: sustained force to dismantle the gangs, or, more controversially, the potential for some armed actors to seek political integration rather than continued confrontation. “Anything is possible in Haiti,” he said. “Gangs may decide that running for office is more advantageous than fighting.”

However, Chantal emphasizes that security operations alone, or political integration without accountability, risk perpetuating the cycle of violence. “Strengthening the police, investing in youth, and holding those who finance violence to account are essential if elections are to signify more than a procedural milestone.”

Looking Ahead: A Complex and Uncertain Future

The situation in Haiti remains deeply complex and uncertain. While the commitments to the GSF offer a glimmer of hope, the underlying political and institutional weaknesses, coupled with the entrenched power of armed groups, pose significant challenges. The success of the mission will depend not only on its ability to restore security but also on addressing the root causes of the crisis, including corruption, impunity, and the lack of economic opportunity. The coming months will be critical in determining whether Haiti can move towards a more stable and democratic future, or whether it will remain trapped in a cycle of violence and instability.