Indonesia’s Prabowo Offers Iran Mediation Amid Policy Scrutiny & US Ties

Indonesia’s Balancing Act: US Ties, Iran Conflict, and Domestic Pressure

The recent joint US-Israeli attack on Iran has placed Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto in a complex position, sparking debate within Indonesia regarding his foreign policy approach and close ties with the United States. While offering to mediate between the warring parties, Prabowo faces growing domestic criticism, particularly concerning his administration’s willingness to participate in former President Trump’s Board of Peace (BOP) and volunteer troops for a potential mission in Gaza. This situation tests Indonesia’s long-held “bebas-aktif” – or “independent and active” – foreign policy stance.

The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced Prabowo’s offer to travel to Tehran to mediate, stating a commitment to restraint and dialogue. However, this move has been met with skepticism, with some questioning its practicality and timing. Dino Patti Djalal, Indonesia’s former deputy foreign minister and ambassador to the US, expressed puzzlement that the offer was made public without prior vetting. Others echoed this sentiment, suggesting it could further alienate Indonesians already wary of Prabowo’s relationship with the Trump administration.

Experts like Ian Wilson, a lecturer in politics and security studies at Murdoch University, believe the offer is unrealistic given the current state of negotiations between Iran and the US. Wilson suggests that domestically, the move could be interpreted as further alignment with Trump and, by extension, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. This concern is amplified by Prabowo’s recent decision to volunteer 8,000 Indonesian troops for deployment to Gaza as part of the International Stabilization Force under the BOP – an organization that includes Israel as a member. Indonesia does not maintain formal diplomatic relations with Israel, and has historically been a strong supporter of an independent Palestine.

A Historical Commitment to Independence

For decades, Indonesia adhered to a “bebas-aktif” foreign policy, avoiding major power blocs while actively promoting peace and national interests. As a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War, Indonesia sought to navigate international relations independently. This approach has included attempts to broker peace in various global conflicts, including the Russia-Ukraine war. However, Indonesia’s involvement with Trump’s Board of Peace, particularly amidst the ongoing conflict in Gaza and now the attack on Iran, presents a significant challenge to this established tradition.

Critics argue that Indonesia’s participation in the BOP risks legitimizing what they describe as a “dystopian plan” to divide Gaza and bypass the role of the United Nations. Sarbini Abdul Murad, director of the humanitarian group Indonesia for Peace and Humanity, described the Foreign Ministry’s initial statement on the attack on Iran as “regrettably naive,” noting the lack of condemnation regarding the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Complex Sentiment Towards Iran

While Indonesia has strong support for Palestine, its relationship with Iran is more nuanced. With the world’s largest Muslim population – approximately 87% of its 270 million citizens – Indonesia’s predominantly Sunni Muslim population differs theologically from Iran’s Shia majority. However, many Indonesians sympathize with Iran, often driven by anti-Israel and anti-American sentiment.

Made Supriatma, a visiting fellow with the Indonesia Studies Programme at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, notes that while past anti-Shia sentiment existed, many Indonesians now sympathize with Iran, though not to the same extent as Palestine. Demonstrations in support of Iran have been largely confined to social media chatter, unlike the widespread protests that erupted following the start of the war in Gaza.

Despite this sympathy, awareness of internal dynamics within Iran, such as recent anti-regime protests, remains limited among many Indonesians. Housewife Arisha Ishana, for example, expressed support for Iran simply because they are “fellow Muslims.” Similarly, a barista named Ramadhan emphasized Iran’s right to self-defense, framing the conflict as a result of US and Israeli aggression, and stating his motivation was rooted in “humanity” rather than religious affiliation. He specifically cited the bombing of a girls’ school in Minab, Iran, which killed 165 students and staff, as a particularly upsetting event.

Re-evaluating Indonesia’s Role

Neither the US nor Iranian officials have publicly responded to Prabowo’s mediation offer. However, Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Boroujerdi welcomed the gesture but expressed skepticism about the possibility of successful negotiations with the US government, citing a perceived lack of adherence to outcomes.

Facing growing domestic pressure, Prabowo convened a meeting with former Indonesian presidents, vice presidents, and political leaders to assess the geopolitical and economic impact of the conflict in Iran. Following the meeting, former Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda announced that Prabowo was willing to “evaluate” Indonesia’s role within Trump’s Board of Peace.

Supriatma suggests Prabowo appears “cornered” by his foreign policy decisions, lacking a clear explanation for Indonesia’s involvement in the BOP and struggling to articulate a consistent stance on the US and Israel. He questions how long Prabowo can maintain his current position in the face of increasingly graphic images of civilian casualties emerging from the conflict. The question remains: can Prabowo navigate this delicate situation and uphold Indonesia’s tradition of independent foreign policy while maintaining ties with the United States?