Russia’s Sahelian Stumble: A Cautionary Tale for Africa & the West

Why Russia Is Losing Its Grip on the Sahel

Since 2020, Russia has been expanding its presence in the Sahel region, aiming to enhance its standing across sub-Saharan Africa and capitalize on instability and popular discontent. Initially, Moscow exploited coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, offering support to the modern regimes. Still, after more than five years, the initial appeal of Russia’s offerings is waning, and its expansion into the Sahel appears to be stalling. This shift stems from shortcomings in Russia’s capacity and a failure to fully understand the complexities of the region.

A Pattern of Missteps and Unfulfilled Promises

Russia’s entry into the Sahel followed a pattern of interventions in Ukraine, Syria, the Central African Republic, and Libya, blending military and intelligence capabilities with disinformation and political subversion. Recognizing an opportunity presented by political instability and a backlash against France, Russia focused initially on Mali following the 2020 coups. Russian operatives, linked to the Wagner private military company, launched disinformation campaigns denouncing the failures of civilian leadership and glorifying Russia as a reliable partner. These efforts helped create conditions for a further coup in 2021, blocking plans for a return to civilian rule.

Similar disinformation campaigns preceded coups in Burkina Faso (2022) and Niger (2023). While the precise impact of these campaigns is difficult to measure, their scale suggests a deliberate and refined strategy. Russia’s direct military and security support to the regimes in these countries granted them a degree of protection and provided Moscow with access to valuable resources, including gold, uranium, and lithium.

Brutal Tactics and Limited Capacity

From the outset, Russia’s military footprint in Mali – initially around 1,000 Wagner mercenaries, growing to approximately 2,500 – proved insufficient to address the scale of the insurgent and jihadi threats. Moscow failed to account for lessons learned from France’s Operation Barkhane, prioritizing attrition over improvements in governance, mediation, or political settlements. This was compounded by indiscriminate violence perpetrated by Russian forces.

The joint Malian-Russian operation to retake Kidal in 2023, while initially successful, ultimately backfired. Brutal attacks on civilians led to increased recruitment into armed opposition groups, uniting previously disparate factions, including secular Tuareg and Arab groups with al-Qaeda affiliates. Reports from UN human rights experts and international media continue to document allegations of torture, rape, forced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings by Russian and Malian forces.

The replacement of Wagner fighters with the Africa Corps, run by the Russian Ministry of Defense, has not demonstrably improved the situation. The Africa Corps appears to have continued Wagner’s intervention model, including its abuses.

Fragmenting Regional Cooperation

Russia has as well failed to foster meaningful security cooperation among Sahelian states. While supporting the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger after their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Moscow’s support has been largely symbolic. A planned joint battalion of 5,000 troops remains under-resourced, and the Africa Corps lacks the experience to build strong relationships with local forces.

Instead, Russia has focused on high-level exchanges, yielding little tangible progress. This lack of cooperation has allowed jihadi groups to reorganize and expand across the region’s porous borders.

A Crowded Field of Competitors

Russia’s challenges are further compounded by the increasing presence of other external actors in the Sahel, including China, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. These countries are offering alternatives to Russia’s approach, focusing on intelligence, arms, training, infrastructure protection, and investment with fewer conditions.

Turkey, in particular, has emerged as a competitor, offering inexpensive Bayraktar drones, and training. These drones are seen by Sahelian regimes as more flexible and politically manageable than relying on foreign mercenaries. China is concentrating on protecting its investments and providing security for its projects, while the UAE has invested heavily in Mali’s gold-mining sector and serves as a key hub for refining and selling Sahelian gold obtained through Russian networks.

Implications for the Region and Beyond

The Kremlin’s missteps in the Sahel offer a cautionary tale for other African states considering Russian assistance. The shortcomings of Russia’s approach – unfulfilled promises, human rights abuses, and limited results – highlight the risks of relying on Moscow’s security offerings. For the United States and Europe, the situation presents an opportunity to exercise restraint and allow Russia to grapple with its own limitations.

Instead of competing with Russia on transactional terms, Western policymakers should prioritize investments in cross-regional cooperation and governance capacity, addressing the root causes of instability and building more durable security in the region. The United States should discreetly support intelligence sharing and mediation efforts to restore links between the Sahelian juntas and ECOWAS, while also strengthening the security and governance capacities of coastal West African states like Benin, Ghana, and Nigeria.

Russia’s engagement in the Sahel has revealed the fragility of the states in the region and the limits of its own capacity. By avoiding a direct rivalry with Moscow and focusing on its traditional strengths, the United States can position itself to re-engage with the Sahel in a way that promotes both its interests and a more lasting stability.