The Forever War Trap: Why Middle-Sized Conflicts Doom US Foreign Policy
The Perilous Terrain of Middle-Sized Wars
The United States finds itself navigating a dangerous landscape, one where conflicts are large enough to inflict significant damage but not substantial enough to fully mobilize the nation. These “middle-sized wars,” as termed by military historian James Stokesbury, present a unique challenge to democracies, potentially ruining presidencies and eroding public trust in the government’s ability to conduct foreign policy. The potential for another such conflict looms, particularly concerning Iran, raising questions about the modern imperial condition of the United States and its propensity for entanglement in conflicts of limited, yet destructive, scope.
Stokesbury observed in 1988 that democracies excel at either small, professional wars or large-scale conflicts demanding total societal mobilization. The difficulty lies in the middle ground – wars that involve some, but not all, of a nation’s resources and commitment. These aren’t limited wars, intentionally constrained in their objectives, but rather conflicts that grow from intended small-scale interventions. U.S. Leaders, the argument goes, often lack a clear understanding of how these escalations unfold.
The “forever wars” in the Middle East – Afghanistan and Iraq – are often considered in this category. Even as undeniably gruesome, they don’t compare in scale to the World Wars of the 20th century. Nor are they akin to swift, limited actions like the invasions of Grenada or Panama, which garnered headlines but remained largely “imperial policing actions.” Interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, similarly, involved fewer American casualties and were primarily air operations with defined limits.
The Allure and Danger of Incrementalism
A core problem with middle-sized wars is the temptation towards incrementalism – the gradual escalation of involvement. This slippery slope can initiate with limited actions, such as air strikes or special forces deployments, and quickly spiral into deeper entanglement. The war in Vietnam, for example, unfolded over years, expanding from initial advisory roles to full-scale military commitment. A similar trajectory is possible in Iran, where the Trump administration’s actions have raised the risk of a broader conflict.
This incremental approach is particularly dangerous because it obscures the long-term consequences of intervention. As one analysis points out, a key danger sign is an overemphasis on geopolitics and a neglect of local cultural and political conditions. The historian Barbara Tuchman argued that the U.S. Would have fared better in Vietnam by focusing more on local realities and less on broader geopolitical strategies. Ignoring the nuances of a region – such as Vietnamese nationalism or Iraqi sectarianism – can lead to disastrous miscalculations.
The Weight of Miscalculation and False Honor
Decision-making in these scenarios is fraught with uncertainty. As Carl von Clausewitz wrote, “War is the province of uncertainty.” Presidents often lack complete information and must produce choices with limited knowledge, facing judgment from those with the benefit of hindsight. The Iraq War serves as a cautionary tale, demonstrating the folly of acting precipitously. While Iran’s nuclear progress may be concerning, it’s not clear whether it necessitated the risk of a middle-sized war, as some have proposed.
Beyond miscalculation, the impulse for “false honor” – reacting violently to perceived insults – can also escalate conflicts. The events in Fallujah, Iraq, in 2004 illustrate this danger. After the deaths of four U.S. Contractors, some officials demanded a forceful response to “teach a lesson,” leading to a costly and protracted battle. The greater the power, the more restraint it must exercise to avoid such escalations.
The Imperial Condition and the Risk of Repetition
The United States, operating as a “de facto empire,” is inherently drawn to involvement in regions of potential benefit, even if not vital to national interests. This repeated entanglement in middle-sized wars, despite repeated pledges to avoid them, reflects this imperial condition. The consequences of these conflicts can be far-reaching, weakening the United States and potentially contributing to its long-term decline.
The potential for further conflicts extends beyond Iran. Tensions with China over Taiwan and the situation in North Korea also present risks of escalation. A conflict in the Western Pacific, home to vital shipping lanes and economies, could have a far greater economic impact than the wars in the Middle East. Similarly, intervention in Venezuela or Nigeria, while seemingly limited, carries the risk of prolonged involvement and unintended consequences.
Avoiding the Trap: Lessons from History
Avoiding middle-sized wars requires a disciplined approach to foreign policy. Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, articulated a doctrine emphasizing the need for overwhelming force, a clear exit strategy, a vital national interest, a defined objective, and broad support before committing to military action. This doctrine, while sometimes sidelined, remains relevant.
Crucially, it requires a commitment to understanding the local context, trusting area specialists, and avoiding the pitfalls of geopolitical abstraction. The State Department’s warnings about Iraq in 2003, and the earlier warnings about a communist takeover in China, highlight the importance of heeding the advice of those with deep regional knowledge.
avoiding middle-sized wars means recognizing the limitations of power and exercising restraint. Empires that have endured longest have done so by avoiding unnecessary conflicts. As the United States approaches its 250th year, its ability to avoid the trap of these protracted, destructive wars will be crucial to its continued success and stability. A fatal split between the public and its governing elite could result if this pattern continues.