Trump’s Plan to Secure Ormuz Strait Faces Risks & Limited Impact
The prospect of a U.S.-led naval escort operation in the Strait of Hormuz is facing significant hurdles, with experts warning that even a successful effort may only restore a fraction of pre-conflict maritime traffic. The waterway, vital for global energy supplies, has seen commercial traffic virtually cease following recent military escalations between the United States, Israel, and Iran.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has threatened to attack any vessel linked to the U.S., Israel, or allied nations transiting the strategic route. Approximately 20% of the world’s oil supply, alongside comparable volumes of liquefied natural gas and fertilizers, passes through the Strait to reach global markets. The disruption has already triggered a surge in commodity prices.
In an effort to alleviate economic pressure, the Trump administration has outlined plans for the U.S. Navy to escort commercial ships through the Strait. President Trump has also appealed to U.S. Allies, and even rivals like China, to contribute warships to the escort missions. But, as of , no firm offers of assistance have been confirmed, a situation analysts attribute to the inherent risks involved.
A Complex Operation
Naval escort missions are inherently complex, demanding close coordination between maritime and air assets to protect both tankers and commercial vessels, as well as the escort ships themselves. Operating in what one analyst described as the “valley of death” – the narrowest point of the Strait of Hormuz – would be an exceptionally difficult undertaking.
Constrained Space
The primary challenge is the limited space. The Strait is approximately 16 kilometers (10 miles) wide at its narrowest point, with an even smaller navigable area for supertankers, some stretching the length of three football fields. This leaves little room for maneuver for both tankers and escort vessels, explained Jennifer Parker, a naval studies researcher at UNSW Canberra and a former officer in the Australian Navy with experience in the Persian Gulf.
Warships – likely destroyers in the case of the U.S. Navy – require space to move around tankers and respond to threats such as drones or missiles. Tankers themselves can also create blind spots for warships. The short reaction time required to counter potential attacks originating from the Iranian coastline presents a significant challenge. “From threat detection to the demand to respond, the timeframe is very limited,” Parker said.
Multiple Threats
Analysts emphasize that destroyer escorts alone are insufficient. Support from helicopters or attack aircraft, ready to engage aerial or maritime drones, is crucial, according to Carl Schuster, a former U.S. Navy captain. Airborne Early Warning and Control (AWACS) aircraft and reconnaissance drones would also be needed to monitor areas within Iran for missile launches.
Meanwhile, Iranian forces capable of posing a threat are dispersed and mobile. Drones and missiles can be launched from trucks, and mines can be deployed by fishing boats or small craft. “Would you be able to destroy all of these vessels to eliminate the threats?” asked Collin Koh, a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. “For me, it’s not very feasible.”
Limited Vessels
Another constraint is the number of available warships. According to Parker, a U.S. Destroyer could escort one or two tankers at a time. Some experts suggest that each tanker may require more than one escort vessel. A report by Lloyd’s List Intelligence, authored by editor-chief Richard Meade, estimates that a basic operation would require eight to ten destroyers to protect convoys of five to ten commercial ships.
Even with that level of deployment, only around 10% of normal traffic through the Strait could be restored.
U.S. Navy Stretched Thin
The U.S. Navy currently operates 73 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, according to the Congressional Research Service. However, only approximately 68% of these ships are combat-ready at any given time due to maintenance and training. This leaves roughly 50 destroyers available, deployed globally.
Deploying ten destroyers to a single escort mission would significantly strain the U.S. Navy’s ability to sustain prolonged operations. “My question is whether the U.S. Navy is prepared for such an intensive campaign,” Koh said.
The Mine Problem
Detecting and neutralizing naval mines presents another major challenge. Last year, the U.S. Navy decommissioned four mine countermeasure ships stationed in the Persian Gulf. These were to be replaced by littoral combat ships with mine countermeasures systems, but only three were in the region prior to the recent conflict.
Ideally, Schuster said, one or two minesweepers should traverse the Strait before tankers to ensure the route is clear. Iran could employ various types of mines, including contact mines with metal spikes, moored mines that detonate based on sound or magnetism, and mines with timers that allow some ships to pass before exploding. “Identifying mines is always a challenge,” Schuster stated.
Allies Hesitant
Analysts suggest that Japan and South Korea could potentially assist with mine countermeasure ships, but have yet to commit. Even then, this would not fully resolve the issue, as these vessels are lightly armed and could grow simple targets for Iran. “It’s not enough to send mine countermeasure forces. you need to send a protection force as well,” Koh said.
A Possible, But Risky, Mission
Schuster believes the mission is possible, noting that the U.S. Navy has faced similar threats from Iran in the 1980s and 1990s. He points out that Iran has been using drones, fast boats, and suicide craft for decades. However, other experts are less optimistic.
Alessio Patalano, a professor at King’s College London, argues that current navies lack the capabilities they possessed in the 1980s. “Fleets and their supporting structures are only a fraction of what they were four decades ago,” he said.
A Greater Foe Than the Houthis
Koh recalls that the Houthi rebels, Iranian allies in Yemen, have already caused significant disruption in the Red Sea in recent years. Despite escorts from the U.S. And the European Union, they have successfully targeted commercial ships. In one instance, a Houthi missile nearly struck a U.S. Destroyer.
“Already there has been difficulty dealing with the Houthi threat,” Koh said. “Now the force will be facing a much larger foe, Iran, which likely possesses a much larger arsenal of drones and missiles.”
Patalano concludes that the U.S. And its partners have underestimated the importance of maritime transport. “For a long time, we assumed it would not be contested—or that, if it were, Western democracies would be able to cope with the challenge,” he said. “That simply isn’t the case.”