US-Israel Strike on Iran’s Leader Raises Questions About Assassination Policy

The killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, in a joint U.S.-Israeli operation has reopened a long-dormant debate within the United States about the legality and morality of assassinating foreign leaders. The operation, described as highly sophisticated, raises fundamental questions about the strategic implications of such actions and whether the U.S. Should be involved in targeted killings beyond traditional wartime scenarios. This event follows decades of shifting U.S. Policy on the matter, marked by periods of explicit prohibition and ambiguous practices.

A History of Ambiguity

While the U.S. Government has long maintained a formal stance against assassination, the historical record reveals a more complex reality. During the Cold War, the possibility of eliminating adversaries, including Soviet leaders, was openly considered, though rarely acted upon directly. As Columbia University historian Timothy Naftali notes, the U.S. Often operated in the shadows, providing support – weapons, intelligence – to local actors who carried out the actual killings. NPR reports that in 1961, the Eisenhower administration sought the removal of Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo, but it was Dominican dissidents who ultimately carried out the assassination.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) too engaged in direct plotting, attempting to assassinate Cuban leader Fidel Castro multiple times throughout the 1960s, including a notorious plot involving a poison pen. These efforts were unsuccessful, but they illustrate the willingness of the U.S. Government to consider extreme measures. The agency also plotted to assassinate Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in 1960, though he was ultimately killed by Congolese rivals.

The Church Committee and a Period of Restraint

Revelations of these covert operations in the 1970s led to public outcry and congressional investigations, most notably the Church Committee. The committee’s 1975 interim report concluded that the U.S. Had been involved in plots to kill foreign leaders and declared that assassination was incompatible with American principles and international order. In 1976, President Gerald Ford issued an executive order formally banning political assassinations.

For over two decades, this ban largely held, though with some ambiguity. Operations against Libya in 1986, targeting Muammar Gaddafi, and against Iraq in the 1990s, targeting Saddam Hussein, blurred the lines. While these were presented as military operations targeting command and control, the possibility of killing the leaders themselves was acknowledged. As Naftali explains, presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton navigated this by framing such actions as military operations rather than explicit assassination attempts.

The Post-9/11 Shift and the Rise of Drone Warfare

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, marked a significant turning point. The authorization of “all necessary means” to combat terrorism arguably opened the door to more aggressive tactics, including targeted killings. The leverage of armed drones became a prominent feature of U.S. Counterterrorism policy, used to eliminate al-Qaeda leaders in various parts of the world. Still, these strikes primarily targeted individuals designated as terrorists, not heads of state.

The Trump administration further complicated the issue with the 2020 drone strike that killed Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad. While the U.S. Considered Soleimani a terrorist, he was also a high-ranking government official, raising questions about the legality and precedent of the action. Iran responded with plots to assassinate U.S. Officials, including then-President Trump, demonstrating the potential for escalation. NPR reported on these retaliatory plots in January 2024.

The Current Debate and Future Implications

The recent killing of Ayatollah Khamenei represents a significant escalation, as it directly targeted the supreme leader of a nation. President Trump publicly celebrated the operation, highlighting the U.S.’s intelligence capabilities. This action has reignited the debate about the long-term consequences of such policies.

Naftali argues that the increasing sophistication of intelligence and military technology lowers the threshold for considering assassination as an option. He emphasizes the need for a national conversation about when, if ever, the U.S. Should violate its own stated principles and engage in the killing of foreign leaders. The potential for reciprocal actions by adversaries and the risk of destabilizing international relations are key concerns.

The question now is whether this operation will usher in a fresh era of more frequent and overt targeting of foreign leaders, or whether it will serve as a cautionary tale. The U.S. Government will likely face increased scrutiny and pressure to clarify its policies on targeted killings and to reaffirm its commitment to international law and ethical considerations. The coming months will likely see increased debate within the U.S. Government and among international legal scholars regarding the justification for this action and its potential ramifications for global security.

Further analysis will be needed to assess the long-term strategic impact of this event, including its effect on regional stability and the potential for retaliatory actions. The U.S. Government will also need to consider the implications for its relationships with allies and adversaries alike.