US-Israel Strikes on Iran: Risks of Failure & Nuclear Proliferation

The coordinated strikes launched by the United States and Israel against Iran on February 28th, dubbed Operation Epic Fury and Operation Roaring Lion respectively, represent a significant escalation in a decades-long effort to constrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions. While officials in Washington and Jerusalem have framed the attacks as a necessary response to escalating regional tensions and Iran’s nuclear program, the operation’s explicit aim – regime change – raises serious questions about the limits of military force in achieving lasting nonproliferation outcomes in the Middle East. The strikes, targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities, ballistic missile infrastructure, and military leadership, come after previous military campaigns in 2025 that, despite degrading Iran’s enrichment infrastructure, failed to fully account for its highly enriched uranium stockpile.

The Stakes and the Actors

The immediate trigger for the latest strikes appears to be Iran’s continued advancement of its nuclear program, despite international sanctions and diplomatic pressure. The United States, under President Donald Trump, and Israel, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, share a long-standing concern that Iran is seeking to develop nuclear weapons, a claim Iran denies. Both countries view a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat to regional stability and their own security interests. Iran, for its part, maintains that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes, such as energy production and medical isotopes. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has repeatedly expressed concerns about Iran’s lack of transparency and its failure to fully cooperate with inspections. The IAEA has reported “lost continuity of knowledge” over key aspects of Iran’s nuclear program.

Beyond the US and Iran, several other actors have a vested interest in the outcome of this conflict. Saudi Arabia, a regional rival of Iran, has expressed concern about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and has hinted at its own pursuit of nuclear weapons if Iran were to acquire one. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has publicly stated this position. The United Kingdom, while not directly involved in the strikes, has urged de-escalation and a return to diplomacy. Russia and China, both permanent members of the UN Security Council, have criticized the US and Israeli actions and called for restraint. The European Union, which was a party to the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran (JCPOA), is deeply concerned about the potential for a wider conflict and the collapse of the nonproliferation regime.

A History of Coercion and Its Limits

The current situation is not an isolated event but rather the latest chapter in a long history of coercive measures aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear program. Since the early 2000s, the international community has employed a combination of sanctions, diplomacy, and, more recently, covert operations and military strikes. The 2015 JCPOA, negotiated between Iran and the P5+1 (the US, UK, France, China, Russia, and Germany), offered a temporary respite, providing Iran with sanctions relief in exchange for verifiable limits on its nuclear program. However, the Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and reimposed sanctions, leading Iran to gradually roll back its commitments under the deal.

The pattern of coercive approaches to weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East has consistently failed to produce more manageable nonproliferation outcomes. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, predicated on the false claim that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, serves as a stark reminder of the dangers of military intervention based on flawed intelligence. The subsequent instability in Iraq created a power vacuum that fueled sectarian violence and the rise of extremist groups. Similarly, the 2011 intervention in Libya, aimed at preventing Muammar Gaddafi from using force against his own people, led to the collapse of the state and a protracted civil war. Both interventions demonstrate the unintended consequences of regime change operations and the difficulty of controlling the aftermath of military conflict.

The Unaccounted Stockpile and Dispersed Command

The recent strikes, like those in June 2025 (Operation Rising Lion and Operation Midnight Hammer), may have degraded Iran’s enrichment infrastructure and eliminated key personnel. However, they have not addressed two critical challenges: the existing stockpile of enriched uranium and the resilience of Iran’s command and control structures. A confidential IAEA report, circulated on February 27th, confirmed that Iran’s last verified stockpile stood at 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity – sufficient for as many as ten nuclear weapons, if further enriched – stored in a tunnel complex at Isfahan that remained largely unaffected by the previous strikes. Locating and securing this material is now even more difficult.

Iran appears to have anticipated further attacks and taken steps to disperse its command structures, delegating response authority to lower-level commanders. This suggests that decapitation strategies – targeting top leaders – are becoming less effective. Israeli strikes last June killed several high-ranking Iranian military officials, including the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, but the regime has proven remarkably resilient. The simultaneous retaliatory attacks launched by Iranian forces across multiple fronts, without waiting for centralized authorization, demonstrate this pre-delegated response authority.

A Regional War and the Proliferation Risk

The current escalation has already triggered a wider regional conflict, with Iranian strikes targeting U.S. Bases across the Gulf, including in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Unlike the June 2025 strikes, where Iran provided advance warning of its retaliatory missile attacks, this time there was no such signal, indicating a more aggressive posture. This multi-front regional war significantly raises the risk of miscalculation and escalation.

Perhaps the most concerning consequence of the strikes is the potential for a proliferation cascade. If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, it would likely embolden other countries in the region to do the same. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has made it clear that it would pursue its own nuclear program if Iran were to cross the nuclear threshold. The United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Egypt are also watching closely. Two military campaigns that have degraded monitoring without eliminating Iran’s nuclear program send a dangerous signal that the nonproliferation regime is unable to constrain a determined state.

What Comes Next?

The diplomatic opening that existed as recently as last week, with talks in Geneva showing “significant progress” according to Omani mediators, is now closed. Washington has not articulated what it would accept as a resolution, leaving no clear framework for future negotiations. Contingency planning must begin now, separate from any future diplomatic efforts, to address three plausible scenarios: regime change, regime collapse, or regime survival. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, while a useful model, is not directly applicable to the Iranian situation, which requires different intermediaries and a realistic assessment of what can be achieved without Tehran’s cooperation.

the situation underscores the limitations of military force in resolving complex political problems. The strikes may have temporarily set back Iran’s nuclear program, but they have also increased regional instability and the risk of proliferation. A lasting solution will require a comprehensive diplomatic strategy that addresses the underlying security concerns of all parties involved, including Iran, and restores confidence in the international nonproliferation regime. The president who pledged to end regime change in the Middle East has now initiated one, with no clear plan for what follows and no guarantee of a better outcome. The coming months will demand a sober reckoning with the challenges left behind: an unaccounted-for uranium stockpile, uncertain command structures, and a regional environment where the allure of nuclear deterrence has never been stronger.