Iran Drones Attack: Shahed 136s Target Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE & US Navy Base

The relatively low-cost, yet increasingly effective, Iranian-made Shahed 136 drone is no longer confined to the battlefields of Ukraine. Over the past 48 hours, hundreds of these unmanned aerial vehicles have been deployed across the Persian Gulf, striking targets in Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE, and elsewhere, as tensions escalate in the region. This marks a significant shift in the drone’s operational theater, signaling Iran’s intent to project power and potentially intimidate allies of the United States.

Footage emerging from Bahrain shows a Shahed 136, easily identifiable by its delta-wing shape, flying towards a high-rise building at night. The distinctive “lawnmower grumble” of its piston engine is audible before the drone impacts the structure, causing significant damage. Another video shows a drone successfully striking and destroying a radar dome at a US naval base in Manama, Bahrain. These incidents highlight the drones’ ability to reach and impact critical infrastructure.

Shahed 136: A Closer Glance at the Technology

The HESA Shahed 136, also known as the Geran-2 in Russian service, is a one-way attack drone – often referred to as a kamikaze or suicide drone – designed for autonomous operation. Manufactured by Shahed Aviation Industries in Iran, the drone is approximately 3.5 meters long with a 2.5-meter wingspan and a weight of 200 kg. It’s powered by an MD-550 piston engine, giving it an operational range of up to 2,500 km and a maximum speed of around 185 km/h. The drone carries a warhead weighing either 50 kilograms or, in more recent Russian-produced versions, up to 90 kilograms. Wikipedia provides a detailed technical overview.

While relatively slow, and not designed to penetrate sophisticated air defenses alone, the Shahed 136’s effectiveness lies in its low cost and ease of production. Estimates for the export price are around $193,000, though domestic production costs are believed to be significantly lower, ranging from $10,000 to $50,000. This affordability allows Iran to deploy them in large numbers, overwhelming defenses and increasing the likelihood of successful strikes. The drone is typically launched in multiples from a rocket-assisted launch rack.

From Ukraine to the Gulf: A Pattern of Deployment

The Shahed 136 first gained prominence during the Russo-Ukrainian war, where Russia utilized it extensively in attacks against Ukrainian infrastructure. The drones were initially exported from Iran, but Russia has since begun manufacturing its own versions at a facility in Yelabuga, on the Volga River. The Guardian reported on Russia’s increased production capacity in July 2025.

The current deployment in the Middle East follows a US-Israeli attack on Iranian targets. More than 1,000 drones, a significant proportion believed to be Shahed 136s, have targeted Iran’s Gulf neighbors since Saturday morning. The UAE reported being attacked by 689 drones, successfully intercepting 645, meaning 44 drones penetrated their defenses – a success rate of just over 6%. This illustrates the challenges of defending against swarms of relatively inexpensive drones.

Terror and Tactical Impact

The Shahed 136’s impact extends beyond its explosive payload. Its distinctive noise and visible approach, often described as a “lawnmower” sound, contribute to a sense of terror. The videos circulating from Bahrain demonstrate this, showing the drone’s deliberate, almost menacing, descent towards its target. While the 50kg payload isn’t typically enough to destroy a skyscraper, it’s sufficient to cause significant damage, and disruption.

In Ukraine, Shahed drones have proven particularly effective at targeting static infrastructure, causing widespread power outages and heating disruptions. Iran appears to be adopting a similar tactic in the Gulf, with a recent drone attack damaging the Ras Tanura refinery, the largest in Saudi Arabia, forcing a temporary shutdown. Although the specific type of drone used in the refinery attack hasn’t been confirmed, the resulting damage aligns with the Shahed 136’s capabilities.

Evolving Capabilities and Countermeasures

While initially designed with a pre-programmed flight path, there is growing evidence that Shahed 136s can now be remotely piloted, allowing for course corrections during the final stages of flight. This adaptability makes them more difficult to intercept. The US military has even developed its own clone of the Shahed 136, dubbed the LUCAS drone, and deployed a squadron to the Middle East in December 2025, demonstrating the concern surrounding this technology. Wikipedia notes this development.

Defending against Shahed drones presents a significant challenge. Traditional air defense systems are often expensive and designed to intercept faster, more conventional threats. The sheer number of drones deployed in recent attacks, coupled with their low radar signature and low-altitude flight, overwhelms existing defenses. The UAE’s 6% penetration rate underscores this vulnerability.

The Role of Decoys

Russia has frequently paired Shahed 136s with “Geran-2” decoys in attacks on Ukraine, complicating defense efforts. These decoys mimic the radar signature of the Shahed 136, forcing air defenses to expend resources on non-threatening targets. While the extent to which decoys were used in the recent Gulf attacks is unknown, it’s a tactic likely to be employed in future deployments.

What comes next will likely involve a continued arms race between drone technology and counter-drone measures. Expect to see further development of directed-energy weapons, electronic warfare systems, and improved radar technologies designed to detect and neutralize these relatively inexpensive, yet increasingly dangerous, unmanned aerial vehicles. The focus will be on improving detection ranges, increasing interception rates, and developing more cost-effective defense solutions.