Southeast Asia & the SCO: Engagement in a Shifting Geopolitical Landscape

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), celebrating its 30th anniversary in 2026, is increasingly drawing the attention of Southeast Asian nations. Founded in 1996 as the Shanghai Five – China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan – the organization initially focused on Central Asian security and combating transnational threats. The addition of Uzbekistan in 2001 formally established the SCO, but its geographical scope and mandate have expanded significantly in recent decades, particularly as geopolitical tensions between China and Russia and the West have intensified. This expansion has led to a growing interest from Southeast Asia, though engagement remains varied and cautious.

A Shifting Geopolitical Landscape

The SCO’s evolution reflects a broader trend towards a multipolar world order. As detailed in a recent report by the ISEAS-Yukon Institute, Southeast Asia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Edging Closer in an Era of Geopolitical Churn, the organization is viewed by some as an alternative to Western-led institutions. This perception has been bolstered by events like the imposition of trade tariffs by the Trump administration, prompting Southeast Asian countries to explore hedging options in an era of major power competition. The SCO offers potential for increased trade and investment, particularly with China and India, but also presents challenges due to its internal complexities and perceived biases.

Expanding Membership, Increasing Complexity

Over the years, the SCO has broadened its membership beyond its initial Central Asian core. Mongolia became an observer in 2004, followed by Afghanistan in 2012. A significant expansion occurred in 2017 with the inclusion of India and Pakistan, followed by Iran in 2023 and Belarus in 2024. This growth, while demonstrating the SCO’s appeal, has also introduced new challenges. The organization now encompasses countries with diverse interests and, in some cases, existing rivalries – such as those between India and Pakistan, and India and China – making consensus-building more difficult. The SCO’s institutional capacity and financial resources have not kept pace with its expanding membership, leading some Western observers to dismiss it as largely ineffective. But, this view overlooks the organization’s potential as a platform for alternative governance structures and economic cooperation.

Southeast Asia’s Cautious Approach

Southeast Asia’s engagement with the SCO has been gradual. Initial limitations stemmed from the organization’s focus on Central Asia, a region of limited priority for ASEAN member states, and a lack of interaction opportunities until the introduction of dialogue partnership status in 2008. As of 2025, only three Southeast Asian nations – Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos – had become dialogue partners. This limited engagement reflects a combination of factors, including existing relationships with Russia and China, and a desire to explore potential economic benefits. However, other Southeast Asian countries have been more hesitant, citing strained relations with China or a lack of perceived benefits.

ASEAN and the SCO: Limited Institutional Ties

Institutional links between ASEAN and the SCO remain relatively weak. Formal contact began in 2002, with a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2005 outlining cooperation on transnational crime. However, practical cooperation has been limited. The differing priorities and geographical focuses of the two organizations, coupled with linguistic barriers (the SCO’s official languages are Russian and Chinese, while ASEAN primarily uses English), have hindered deeper collaboration. ASEAN’s commitment to its own centrality in the Indo-Pacific region also contributes to its cautious approach, as closer ties with the SCO could be perceived as diluting that centrality. Despite regular attendance of the Secretary-Generals at each other’s summits, substantive cooperation remains minimal.

Cambodia: A First Mover

Cambodia was the first Southeast Asian country to become an SCO dialogue partner in 2015, a move largely attributed to the close economic and political ties fostered during the premiership of Hun Sen. Phnom Penh views the SCO as a means to promote development through increased trade and investment, particularly with China. Hun Sen’s successor, Hun Manet, reaffirmed Cambodia’s commitment to the SCO at the 2025 Tianjin Summit, praising the organization’s focus on sovereignty and territorial integrity. fulcrum.sg highlights this continued engagement.

Laos and Myanmar: Recent Entrants

Laos applied for and was accepted as a dialogue partner at the 2025 Tianjin Summit, seeking to diversify its economic dependencies and mitigate the impact of trade tariffs. Myanmar, facing international isolation following the 2021 military coup, has also strengthened ties with the SCO, particularly with Russia and China. At the Tianjin Summit, China referred to Myanmar’s coup leader, Min Aung Hlaing, as “acting president” and endorsed the country’s bid for full SCO membership, signaling a significant level of support for the military regime. This support provides Myanmar with a crucial diplomatic and potential financial lifeline.

Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam: A More Measured Stance

Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam have adopted a more cautious approach. Indonesia, under President Prabowo Subianto, has signaled a desire to play a more active role in multilateral institutions and advocate for the Global South, but has not yet applied for SCO partnership. Malaysia, while supportive of the Global South agenda, prioritizes its relationship with ASEAN. Vietnam, pursuing a “bamboo diplomacy” strategy of balancing relations with major powers, has also been hesitant, citing concerns about its existing commitments and potential strains with China over South China Sea disputes.

India’s Anti-Dumping Duty on Chinese Chemical

Amidst these evolving dynamics, economic tensions continue to play a role. Reuters reports that India has recommended an anti-dumping duty on a Chinese chemical used in the dye industry, highlighting ongoing trade friction that influences regional geopolitical calculations.

Looking Ahead

The SCO’s future role in Southeast Asia remains uncertain. While the organization offers potential benefits in terms of economic cooperation and a platform for alternative governance, its institutional weaknesses, internal divisions, and perceived biases pose significant challenges. The extent of Southeast Asian engagement will likely depend on the evolving geopolitical landscape, the SCO’s ability to address its internal shortcomings, and the individual priorities of each ASEAN member state. Further expansion of the SCO’s membership, particularly if Myanmar is admitted, will undoubtedly shape its future trajectory and its relationship with Southeast Asia. The next key event will be the SCO’s annual summit in 2026, marking its 30th anniversary, where further developments in membership and cooperation are expected to be announced.